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Abstract
Registered unemployment has represented over 10% of the labour force in Hungary 
since mid-1992 but little is known about the inflows and outflows that result in an 
unemployment stock of this size. The paper investigates these flows using a sample 
of nearly 40,000 spells of unemployment insurance (UI) receipt drawn from 
administrative records of the UI system. We emphasise the modest level of inflows 
(although higher than previously thought) and show the variation in inflow rates by 
sex, age, education, and region. Outflows are remarkably low with UI exhaustion 
being the most common form of exit from the UI register for the individuals in our 
sample despite their often long entitlement periods to benefit. Following non- 
parametric analysis of the spell data we estimate a parametric competing risks model 
that summarises variation in exit probabilities with individual characteristics and 
region to six states - employment, subsidised employment, subsidised self- 
employment, training, public works, and disqualification. We draw conclusions for 
labour market policy in Hungary and for further research.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The available evidence on unemployment dynamics in the economies in 
transition of Central Europe indicates that the turnover in the unemployed pool 
is typically low (Boeri, 1994, 1994a). Unemployment has emerged rapidly since 
1990 in most countries in the region but it seems that this has often been 
associated with only modest flows into unemployment. The growth in 
unemployment has been more the result of very low outflows. This has 
implications for both how the transition process should be viewed in the 
countries concerned and for labour market and income support policy. For 
example, a low outflow rate implies that expected duration of unemployment will 
be long for any entrant, with resulting threat of loss of human capital and labour 
market attachment and a need for income support that may last long after 
expiry of entitlement to unemployment insurance benefit of limited duration.1
In this paper we investigate the dynamics of unemployment in Hungary. 
Although Hungary appears to fit the picture of a labour market with low 
turnover in the unemployed pool, there has been little investigation of this 
phenomenon to date. Regular analyses of the registered unemployed stock (and 
of the stock defined on a search basis in the new Labour Force Survey) show 
clearly the uneven incidence of unemployment across different population 
groups. But whether this is the result of differences in inflow rates or outflow 
rates or both is not specifically addressed by these analyses. Whether, for 
example, labour-shedding by enterprises is concentrated on the old and the 
unskilled is unclear. In the case of the outflow there has been the suggestion 
that individual characteristics matter relatively little (Boeri, 1994). If true, this 
weakens the argument for re-training for the unemployed to be targeted on 
particular groups. Which groups of workers have a greater risk of entering 
unemployment? Which groups escape unemployment more quickly? To where 
do the unemployed go after leaving the register? The purpose of this paper is to 
use large samples of individual level microdata to analyse the dynamics of 
unemployment in Hungary and so to shed light on these sorts of issues.
The data we use are drawn from administrative registers of the 
unemployment insurance (UI) scheme so our analysis is restricted to flows to 
and from insured unemployment. (This source is described in detail in the 
Appendix.) Figure 1 shows that at the end of 1992 just under 70 percent of the 
registered unemployed stock in Hungary received UI, but lengthening durations 
on account of the low outflow rate together with cuts in entitlement periods for 
UI have sharply reduced the coverage by UI of the stock to less than 40 percent
1 It is possible that the low outflow rate is in part the result of disincentives 
in the benefit system, which would have rather different implications for income 
support policy. We do not consider disincentive effects in this paper.
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by April 1994. The nature of our data source also means that (i) we are unable 
to say anything about flows to and from unemployment defined on a criterion of 
behaviour rather than registration, and (ii) that the information we have about 
each individual in the data is limited- However, administrative registers have 
the great advantage of providing large samples of spells. Our analysis is of the 
complete inflow into UI receipt in March 1992, which provides nearly 40,000 
spells. This allows us to detect differences in inflow and outflow rates across 
different groups with a high degree of precision.
In Section 2 we calculate monthly inflow rates by sex, age, education, 
occupation and region (county). We also describe why the official measure of 
inflow appears to be an underestimate of the true value. Section 3 traces the 
March 1992 inflow through the UI registers to February 1994, describing the 
duration of spells and exit rates to various labour market states using non- 
parametric techniques. Despite the long entitlement periods to benefit of most of 
our sample, the most common exit state from the UI register is exhaustion of 
entitlement, and not employment, which reflects the low outflow rate. Treating 
exhaustion as censoring, we estimate the median duration of insured 
unemployment to be over a year. The empirical hazard of exit to employment 
displays a somewhat surprising time pattern. Section 4 estimates a parametric 
model of the exit probabilities that allows for exit to different labour market 
states. Section 5 summarises our findings and draws out conclusions for labour 
market policy in Hungary and for future research.
2. INFLOW INTO UI RECEIPT
In this section we present calculations of the monthly rates of flow into 
receipt of UI in the Spring of 1992. At this time the registered unemployment 
rate was just under 10 percent. By Spring 1993 it had risen to 14 percent and 
has since fallen to 11 percent by June 1994 - see Figure 1. We observe the inflow 
into UI receipt for the period 21 February-20 March 1992.
Our first finding is a simple but important one. The number of new spells 
of payment in this period recorded in the National Labour Centre’s UI database 
from which we draw our data is substantially higher than the official figure for 
the inflow into UI for the same period that the Centre publishes, which is based 
on the same source. (The monthly figures for inflows published by the NLC 
always refer to the 21st of one month to the 20th of the next.) The flow data 
published monthly by the NLC are preliminary figures and do not include 
entries to the register within the relevant period that are reported by the local 
employment offices after this period has finished. The published inflow figure 
for March 1992 (i.e. 21 February-20 March) is 25,739 persons but using the 
updated database to calculated the inflow we get a total of 39,417 persons - 50
2
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percent higher. Figure 2 shows the official inflow figures for each month in 1992 
and that for March does not seem to be an outlier. We must be careful in 
drawing general conclusions based on data for a single month and we do not 
know whether late reporting was a particular problem during the period in 
question. With these provisos the results suggest that inflow into registered 
unemployment in Hungary is substantially higher than recorded in official 
published figures.2
Although Figure 2 suggests that the level of inflow into UI in March 1992 
was not abnormal, recorded inflow throughout the first half of 1992 should have 
been affected by a severance pay scheme introduced at the end of 1991. This 
pays 1-6 months wages to workers dismissed for other than disciplinary reasons, 
the period depending on length of service with the last employer (3-4 years of 
service leads to one month of wages and 25 years or more to 6 months). UI does 
not begin until after the period of wages is completed, implying that UI inflow 
will have been depressed for the first half of 1992 (and in a way that will 
presumably have varied with age and education.) (The restriction to service 
with the same employer limits the problem somewhat since job-to-job changes 
were relatively common pre-reform.) As this emphasises, our definition of inflow 
is not the date of claim to UI but the date that payment started (something that 
is forced on us by the data).3
We relate the inflow to the average stock of employment in the first 
quarter of 1992 so as to estimate inflow into "insured unemployment" 
(unemployment covered by UI) from employment. We therefore exclude from the 
inflow those persons who have not worked within the preceding 6 months. This 
is 7,203 out of the 39,419 new spells of UI receipt - some 18 percent.4 We have 
also attempted to restrict the definition of employment in the denominator to 
"insured employment", some 85 percent of total employment under the 
definitions we use. We have excluded from the employed population those who 
apparently do not qualify for UI, i.e. the self-employed and people who have 
reached pension age.5 (Details are given in the Appendix.)6
2 Figure 2 shows the inflow including both unemployment insurance and the 
career beginners benefit schemes (CB benefits). The latter made up only 2 
percent of the inflow in March 1992.
3 The NLC applies a similar definition in the official statistics.
4 We could of course have chosen to measure the rate of inflow from all labour 
market states, implying the retention of these spells and the definition of the 
denominator as the simply the working age population. But since our definition 
of unemployment is already restricted to receipt of UI we decided it made more 
sense in analysis of the inflow to restrict attention to flows from employment.
5 Pension age in Hungary is 60 years for men and 55 years for women.
6 Although the numerators in our calculations of inflow rates are the true 
population totals (since we observe the complete inflow) this is not true of the 
denominators since they are grossed-up sample values taken from the Labour
3
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Inflow rates by sex and manual/non-manual status are shown below.
manual non-manual all
male 1.41% 0.38% 1.14%
female 1.24% 0.36% 0.80%
all 1.35% 0.37% 0.98%
The total monthly inflow rate of one percent is effectively the same as the 
average monthly inflow rates into registered unemployment reported by Boeri 
(1994, Table 2) in France and in the UK in 1991 and in western Germany in 
1992, at a time when their registered unemployment rates (especially in the first 
two) were not dissimilar to that found in Hungary in March 1992 - 9.5 percent, 
8.1 percent, and 5.8 percent respectively compared to 9.8 percent. The true 
similarity in inflow rates is not as great on account of differences in definition. 
Our calculation is restricted to flows between "insured" employment and 
unemployment. The definitions of both numerator and denominator are broader 
for the three OECD countries (all registered unemployed and the working-age 
population). Nevertheless, the similarity is striking and shows that the inflow 
rate in Hungary is not high by international standards (as Boeri’s analysis has 
been prominent in showing) so an explanation of high unemployment in 
Hungary that attempts to focus on the separation rate from jobs is 
inappropriate.7
The substantially higher inflow rates for manual workers - around three 
times those for non-manual workers - comes as little surprise. The lower overall 
inflow rate for women is of some interest in view of Hungary’s unusual position 
in Eastern Europe of having a lower unemployment rate for women. This 
difference in male and female unemployment rates in Hungary seems entirely 
due to lower inflows since we show below that spell durations of women are in 
fact somewhat longer than those of men. The difference is much less when 
controlling for manual/non-manual status and the differential in the overall
Force Survey (LFS). The LFS interviews about 30,000 households per quarter 
but even with a sample of this size there is significant sampling error for highly 
disaggreagated totals. So our calculations of inflow rates are in turn only 
estimates of the population values.
7 Sensitivity to definitions is demonstrated by the comparison of our figure 
for the inflow rate with that of Boeri for Hungary for the whole of 1992. His 
figure is 0.5 percent, or half our estimate for March. The principal difference 
appears to be that Boeri’s figure is based on the preliminary inflow figures taken 
from official sources, which we have argued may substantially understate the 
real level of inflows. (Figure 2 suggests that the use of an annual figure rather 
than one for a single month is not an important part of the explanation. The 
average of the published monthly inflows in 1992 was 9 percent higher than the 
published figure for March.)
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inflow rate in part just reflects that many more women are employed in non- 
manual jobs than are men (about a half of women compared to only a quarter of 
men).
We now disaggregate by age, education, occupation and region. Figure 3 
shows inflow rates by age. The low rates for teenagers are a reflection of our 
concentration on the inflow to UI - we are not including in the analysis those 
who join the register direct from full-time education or who enter from work but 
with insufficient employment history to qualify for UI. (We are no doubt 
unsuccessful in our attempt to restrict the denominator to "insured employment" 
for this age-group, and this pushes downwards our measured inflow rate.) 
Leaving this age-group aside, the inflow rates by age for the two sexes are 
notably different. The inflow for young men is relatively high, the rate for those 
aged 20-24 is 2.2 percent - three times the rate for men aged 50-54 who have the 
lowest rate of inflow. The female rates display less variation with age and it is 
those aged 25-29 who have the highest rate.8 The rates for both sexes rise for 
the last age-group before retirement age, but not hugely. The pattern with age 
for men is qualitatively similar to that in Britain in the late 1970s (Stem, 1989).
We certainly see no suggestion of job loss in Hungary in transition being 
concentrated on the old. Indeed, if we assume that the job-to-job flows are 
higher among the young then the differences in separation rates between 
younger and older men will be even higher than the UI inflow rates.
Inflow by schooling level is shown in Figure 4. Secondary schooling, 
whether "general or vocational", permits entrance to college or university 
(conditional on exam success) whereas the lower level vocational non-secondary 
schooling does not. Here the patterns are similar across the sexes - lower 
education is associated with higher inflow rates. While those with college or 
university education have an inflow rate of only 0.3 percent (taking the sexes 
and both forms of education together), those who failed to complete primary 
school enter at the rate of 2.8 percent for men and 2.4 percent for women. 
Unemployment inflow is highly concentrated on the less educated. An exception 
to this rule is shown by the very similar inflow rates for men with only primary 
level schooling and those who went on to vocational (but sub-secondary) 
schooling, and this reflects the commonly expressed view that there has been 
over-investment in vocational education in Eastern Europe. Also in line with 
this is the finding that although completion of secondary schooling is associated 
with substantially lower inflow rates, the rate for vocational secondary for men 
is higher than for general secondary.
8 One possible explanation for the level of the inflow rate for women aged 20- 
24 is that this is the age-group when child care leave is most likely, as indicated 
by the age-specific fertility rate (Statistical Yearbook of Hungary 1992. Table 
2.29). Women on child care leave are included in the denominator of the inflow 
rate but can remain on child care leave if their jobs are cut.
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Figure 5 shows inflow rates by county. (The city of Budapest is one county 
but the other counties all contain both urban and rural areas.) Taking both 
sexes together the county inflow rates range from 0.48 percent in Budapest to 
1.94 percent of county Szabolcs - a factor of four. Figure 6 plots the inflow rates 
together with county unemployment rates in March 1992. The two appear quite 
closely related (the correlation coefficient is 0.81), suggesting that variations in 
inflow are an important source of regional differences in overall unemployment. 
(The fact that the inflow rates refer only to one month should of course be borne 
in mind.) Budapest has the lowest unemployment rate and lowest inflow rate. 
The group of three western counties bordering Austria, together with the county 
of Pest which surrounds Budapest, come next. Szabolcs in the east of the 
country is where high unemployment first developed and we see an inflow rate 
and unemployment rate that are both about double the national average. There 
are two outliers; Szabolcs’s neighbour Borsod, in the north-east comer of 
Hungary and also a high unemployment area for some time, has only a medium 
level inflow rate and Bekes where inflow is high and unemployment not 
particularly so. We show in the next section that by contrast the county outflow 
rate is only weakly correlated with the unemployment rate.
3. SURVIVAL AND THE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF EXIT
In the remainder of the paper we analyse the outflow from UI receipt. 
How long do spells of UI last and what characteristics are associated with spell 
length? How do spells o f UI receipt end? In contrast to our calculation of inflow 
rates in the previous section, we use here the complete inflow sample for March 
1992 including those individuals who appear not to have entered UI receipt from 
work. Our sample is therefore of 39,417 spells (We use the word "sample" 
although our analysis is of the complete inflow for the month in question.) In 
this section we use non-parametric techniques to describe spell lengths, and to 
show how the exit probability varies over the course of a spell.
Table 1 gives the distribution of the exit state for the 39,417 spells, as 
indicated by central UI records in February 1994. In order to interpret this we 
need to give some information on duration of UI entitlement since this puts an 
upper limit on the length of spells we can observe. (Details are given in Table 
A1 in the Appendix.) Over 90 percent of the sample receive UI under the terms 
of legislation effective from January 1992. We refer to these people as being on 
the 92 scheme. Entitlement to UI under the January 1992 rules is for between 
4'A and 18 months depending on employment history in the previous 4 years 
(one year of work being required for the minimum and 4 years for the 
maximum). The 9 percent receiving UI under the rules applying to claims before 
January 1992 is formed almost exclusively of persons quitting jobs in 1991 and
6
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claiming benefit in that year but who did not start their spell of UI until 1992 
due to the 3 month delay in the start of benefit that is imposed for voluntary 
quitting. This delay also means that all 92 scheme recipients are job losers since 
no quitter registering in 1992 would have been able to start receipt before our 
inflow period ended. Entitlement periods for UI under the 91 scheme were 
longer, from 6 months to 2 years. More than one-third of those receiving under 
the 92 scheme have an entitlement period at the maximum, over a half have 
entitlement of 450 days or more, and nearly-three quarters at least a year (the 
figures are almost identical for men and women). Maximum entitlement is less 
common among those under the 91 scheme, but over a half have entitlement of 
500 days or more. Only 8 percent of the 92 scheme claimants have entitlement 
of 180 days or less and only 4 percent of 91 scheme claimants. The spells
labelled "censored" in Table 1 include a few spells under the 91 scheme still in 
progress in February 1994 but the principal reason for censoring, which accounts 
for 6 percent of all spells, is that we can lose track of a spell in the central UI 
records. We observe a final date at which benefit was still being paid but no 
indication of a reason for it ceasing, so we treat these spells as being censored at 
their final date of observation. It is likely that many of these spells later 
continued after a period of suspension, which may occur for a variety of reasons 
(see Appendix).
What is most striking about Table 1 is that exhaustion of UI is the most 
common form of exit from the UI register. Despite the quite lengthy maximum 
entitlement periods for benefit - VA or 2 years - and the fact that many of the 
sample are entitled to the maximum or near the maximum, the most likely way 
to stop receiving UI is to run out of entitlement. As much as 43 percent of the 
sample exhaust their entitlement to benefit. (Even if all the censored spells 
were to end in an exit to a job it would still be the case that exhaustion 
accounted for more exits than does re-employment.)
Re-employment accounts for a third of exits in Table 1 - twice as many as 
all other types of exit taken together.9 Were our data to record the fate of those 
exhausting UI the relative importance of job exits could fall since only half of UI 
exhausters go on to receive Social Benefit (Lazar and Szekely, 1994, Table 1) and 
the others presumably leave the register. Among other types of exit, early 
retirement and transfer to old-age pension (6.7 percent) and disqualification (3.9 
percent) are the most common. The latter occurs when a claimant has refused a 
job offer or training scheme found by the employment office or when the 
claimant "misbehaves" when following-up a vacancy found by the office, for 
example by attending an interview while drunk. (Disqualification is for 90
9 Boeri (1994, Table 2) estimates outflows to jobs in Hungary from receipt of 
UI and Career Beginner’s benefit to have been less than half of all outflows in 
1992. Our data suggest a substantially higher figure, about two-thirds of 
recorded exits other than UI exhaustion, and we believe the reason is that 
Boeri’s outflow figures include persons exhausting UI.
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days.) Exit to a variety of labour market programmes in the form of public 
works, subsidised employment, start-up allowance for the self-employed and 
government sponsored training schemes together account for a further 5 percent. 
Participants in training schemes get a "training subsidy", which amounts to 10 
percent more than their UI benefits. The training schemes vary considerably in 
nature. They may be organised by the county employment office or by private 
firms and last anything from a few weeks up to a year; an individual may even 
find his or her own scheme and then apply to the employment office for approval. 
Subsidised employment involves the firm receiving a wage subsidy or obtaining 
an investment subsidy in return for hiring from the unemployment register. 
Public works are typically organised by local authorities and pay close to the 
minimum wage. The start-up scheme for the self-employed pays an allowance 
equal to the claimant’s unemployment benefit for a period of 6 months.
The table also shows how the distribution of exit states varies with sex 
and benefit scheme and this information is of considerable interest. Despite the 
entitlement periods to UI being very similar for men and women in practice, 
their exit states from UI have rather different distributions. A notably lower 
proportion of women exit to a job - 31 percent compared to 41 percent of men 
(including the category of subsidised employment). Higher proportions of 
women exhaust UI (46 percent compared to 42 percent), enter training, are 
disqualified, or leave for early retirement/reach pension age. In short, women 
are substantially less likely to leave UI for work and more likely to leave for 
some other reason or to exhaust entitlement.
The breakdown by benefit type should be interpreted as a breakdown by 
reason for entering the UI register, since 92 scheme claimants in our sample are 
job losers and 91 scheme claimants are job quitters. (We prefer to keep the 
columns labelled by scheme since this is a reminder that duration of entitlement 
differs between the schemes.) Among the 91 scheme claimants 53 percent 
exhaust entitlement, despite their longer entitlement periods, compared to 43 
percent of the 92 scheme claimants. Only 24 percent exit to a job and more are 
disqualified than among claimants under the 92 scheme. Voluntary quitters are 
clearly less likely to leave UI for work (during the time that they receive UI) and 
are more likely to stay unemployed until they exhaust their entitlement.
We now consider the length of time people receive UI. In Figure 7 we 
show the empirical survivor function for spells of UI, estimated using the 
Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator. This shows the proportion of the sample 
who are still receiving UI at each point in time, taking into account any 
censoring along the way. We estimate the survivor function with two different 
treatments of UI exhaustion. The lower line in the figure (marked "A") treats 
exhaustion as an exit from UI, along with all other exits. (The 6 percent of spells 
in the bottom line of Table 1 are the only spells treated as censored.) In this case 
the survivor function drops both continuously as people leave UI for
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employment, training etc, and in steps as groups of people with the same period 
of entitlement to UI run out of benefit.
In one sense we are indeed interested in UI exhaustion. It measures how 
much people do in fact use up their full UI entitlement, and it is indicative of the 
extent of ongoing need for further income support. However, if we wish to look 
at survival in "registered unemployment" from the "risk" of exit to some other 
labour market state, then the appropriate thing to do is to treat exhaustion as 
another case of censoring. Receipt of UI finishes but there is no reason to 
assume that this necessarily leads to a move off the unemployment register. It 
seems unlikely in the current state of the Hungarian labour market that many 
claimants can time a return to work for the week following UI exhaustion. And 
we know from analyses of the National Labour Centre that about half of UI 
exhausters go on to receive means-tested Social Benefit. On the other hand the 
remainder have no financial incentive to remain registered. (It is not the case 
that social insurance contributions continue to be paid by the National Labour 
Centre after UI finishes.) The upper line in Figure 7 (marked "B") estimates the 
survivor function treating as censored those spells ending in UI exhaustion as 
well as the small number of spells for which we really do not know the exit state. 
(The two lines coincide until the first exhaustion takes place at 145 days.) This 
is a treatment of exhaustion that we maintain for the rest of the paper and in 
view of this, we refer at times to "unemployment spells" rather than UI spells. 
To the extent that exhaustion does lead quickly, or even immediately, to a 
cessation of registration as unemployed, the true survivor function for spells of 
registered unemployment will lie in between the two lines in Figure 7.10
The bottom line in the figure shows that the median duration of receipt of 
UI is just over 10 months (315 days) but that a quarter receive for 450 days or 
more. Treating exhaustion as censoring (top line), we estimate that less than a 
quarter of the inflow cohort leave the register within 6 months and the median 
spell duration is over 13 months - 409 days.
In considering these survival probabilities it is worth pointing out that 
they do not give us estimates of outflow rates from unemployment of the type 
usually reported in international comparisons. Such comparisons are usually 
based on outflow from the stock of unemployment, and not from an inflow cohort. 
The outflow rate from the latter can be expected to be higher since the stock 
oversamples those persons with lower probabilities of leaving the register (the 
phenomenon of "length bias" e.g. Kiefer, 1988). We have therefore calculated the 
empirical survivor function for the stock of UI recipients in March 1992, who we
10 The treatment of exhaustion as censoring is the natural choice for any 
researcher working with data on UI spells. This is the practice, for example, in 
the well-known paper by Meyer (1990) who analyses duration of receipt of UI in 
the USA. However, his data are characterised by a far lower incidence of 
exhaustion than ours with only 201 out of 3,365 spells censored due to UI 
exhaustion (p.761).
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are also able to trace through the UI records. (In this case we analyse a 10 
percent sample of the stock and not the whole population but this still gives us 
over 35,000 spells; we analyse the benefits received by this sample in 
Micklewright and Nagy, 1994.) UI exhaustion is again treated as censoring. We 
estimate the one month outflow rate from the stock as 4.9 percent, taking both 
sexes together. This is in fact higher than the outflow rate from our inflow 
cohort during the first month, which is only 3.7 percent. This may seem 
surprising but we show below that the probability of leaving unemployment in 
our inflow sample is at one of its lowest points in the first few weeks, and the 12 
month outflow rate from the inflow sample is several points higher than that 
from the stock (41.3 percent and 38.2 percent respectively for all exits other than 
exhaustion and 28.2 percent and 25.4 percent for job exits).
The one month outflow rates from both the March 1992 stock and inflow 
samples will reflect conditions in the aggregate labour market during that 
month, which may have been abnormal. A more representative estimate of the 
monthly exit rate from the stock is probably obtained from the 12 month rate 
using the assumption that the rate of exit was constant throughout the year. 
This yields a monthly exit rate of 3.9 percent if we treat UI exhaustion as 
censoring and 8.2 percent if we do not. The true rate of exit from registered 
spells of unemployment that start with UI should lie somewhere in between. 
These figures bracket the estimate of 5.2 percent reported by Boeri (1994) for the 
whole of 1992 for all registered unemployment in Hungary. These estimates 
may be compared with monthly outflow rates from the stock of 10-15 percent for 
various Western European countries (also given by Boeri) and the comparison 
underlines the low level of the outflow rate in Hungary.11
Figure 8 plots the survivor function separately for men and women. That 
for women lies slightly above that for men, so women are less likely to leave the 
register. The differences are small and the lower inflow rate shown in Section 2 
(admittedly only from employment) more than compensates for this small 
difference, resulting in the lower overall unemployment rate for women. When 
interpreting Figure 8 it should be remembered that all exits states are grouped 
together, and we have seen in Table 1 that there are some marked differences 
between the distribution of exit states by sex.
In the previous section we saw how county inflow rates are quite closely 
correlated with unemployment rates. Figure 9 demonstrates that the same is 
less true of the outflow rates. It shows the proportion of our inflow sample in 
each county who leave the UI register within 3 months of entry (there is no 
exhaustion within this period). There is substantial variation in outflow across
11 The outflow during the first month from our inflow cohort of only 4 percent 
may be compared with a figure of 26 percent for a cohort of the male inflow in 
Britain in 1978, when aggregate unemployment was about 7 percent 
(Narendranathan et al, 1989, p22).
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the country, and the rates differ by a factor of about three (compared to four for 
the inflow rates) from the low of less than 8 percent in Borsod to nearly 23 
percent in Somogy. There are counties with both high unemployment and low 
outflow, notably Borsod, Nograd and Szabolcs, and those with low 
unemployment and high outflow, in particular the western counties of Vas and 
Zala. But we also see groups of counties with very similar outflow rates and 
quite different unemployment rates, for example the group of seven counties 
including Budapest with outflow rates of around 11-12 percent. The correlation 
coefficient is -0.46 which is only just significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level. Comparison with Figure 6 shows that Bekes stands out as a 
county with both high inflow and high outflow.
The variation in the probability of leaving unemployment over the course 
of a spell is of considerable interest but the survivor functions in Figures 7 and 8 
show this only indirectly (through changes in the slope of the function). Figures 
10-13 address the issue directly by plotting the empirical hazard function for the 
sample of spells, again estimated with the Kaplan-Meier method. (We continue 
to treat UI exhaustion as censoring and were we not to do so there would of 
course be massive spikes at the different points where groups of people exhaust.)
These figures shows the probability of leaving the register in a given interval of 
time conditional on having survived up until that point, where we have specified 
the intervals as two weeks long. Defining this conditional probability or 
"hazard" as h, F as the cumulative density of spell length, and f  as the 
probability density function, then h = f7[l-F] (where 1-F is the survivor function 
that was the subject of Figures 7 and 8). Figure 10 shows the hazard for exit to 
any state (except exhaustion). Figure 11 shows the hazard to re-employment, 
i.e. the probability of leaving the register to a new job conditional on having 
survived all "risks" to that point. The difference between the two gives the 
hazard to other exit states taken together and this is shown in Figure 12 (exit to 
subsidised employment, subsidised self-employment, public works, training, 
disqualification, pension/early retirement and "other"). The vertical lines in the 
diagrams show the 95 percent confidence intervals and their generally small 
height show the great advantage in the large sample size at our disposal. The 
confidence intervals get bigger as time proceeds since the number of spells still 
"at risk" is diminishing. It is important to bear in mind that with one or two 
exceptions spells observed to be longer than 18 months all relate to persons 
receiving UI under the 91 scheme (exhaustion having already occurred under 
the 92 scheme). There are many fewer of these spells (the number of spells at 
risk falls sharply) and this is the reason for the big jump in the size of the 
confidence intervals at this point. The change in the hazard, which appears to 
fall sharply, may be a reflection of the different behaviour of these persons. As 
we have noted earlier, they are all voluntary quitters.
The are several interesting features of these hazards. First, there is no 
overall downward slope that can be discerned in Figure 10. There are three
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reasons why we might expect such a slope. If behaviour of the unemployed and 
of employers (or other agents controlling exits) is unchanged during a spell, the 
overall empirical hazard must decline as those with characteristics positively 
correlated with finding a job (or exiting for some other reason) move off the 
register first, leaving behind those with lower exit probabilities. If time spent 
unemployed reduces motivation to search or is treated by employers as a signal 
of lower productivity a downward sloping hazard will again result ("negative 
duration dependence"). Finally, the overall unemployment rate in Hungary 
continued to increase throughout much of the time we observe the sample - see 
Figure 1 - suggesting that competition for jobs was getting tougher. But none of 
these possible influences appears to be reflected in the empirical hazards.
Second, the probability of exit increases early in the spell, and in fact the 
exit rate in the first two weeks is one of the lowest. Comparison of Figures 11 
and 12 show that this change in the overall hazard is driven by the change in 
the hazard for exit to work. (That for other exits does not change much early in 
the spell.) This is open to a number of interpretations. It is possible that a 
successful claim for UI is followed by a short period of relatively low job search 
effort. Or the low hazard at this time may merely reflect conditions in the 
aggregate labour market in Spring 1992.
Third, there is a dip in the hazard that seems to be caused by a reduced 
probability of job exits at around 10 months, which, given that we are tracking a 
March inflow sample, is the period around Christmas/New Year. It may be that 
this is a period when employers hire less or when job search activity is reduced 
and comparison of Figures 11 and 12 shows that the dip in the overall hazard is 
indeed driven principally by the job exit hazard.
Fourth, we see a spike in the job exit hazard shortly before the point at 
which those with maximum entitlement period under the 92 scheme would 
exhaust benefit (540 days). This is suggestive of the operation of an increased 
incentive to find work as the benefit expiry point approaches. (A maximum 
period of benefit is the modal entitlement period in the sample, which may 
explain why it is easier to see any spike at this point than at earlier exhaustion 
points.) We intend to investigate this more closely in future work.
Fifth, the "other exits" hazard jumps sharply upwards after 180 days and 
then falls back somewhat to oscillate around a level above that in the first 6 
months. This pattern is driven by the hazard to early retirement, for which 
claimants within 3 years of normal retirement age are eligible after 6 months of 
benefit. (The decision to allow early retirement, which leads to the individual 
starting receipt of the old-age pension, is discretionary; about 70 percent of 
individuals in the sample within the relevant age group do in fact leave the 
register in this way.) The other exits hazard also rises just before the end of the 
maximum entitlement period under the 92 scheme at 540 days. We have yet to 
investigate the causes of this but it may be that both claimants and local
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employment offices look harder for available labour market programmes as 
benefit entitlement runs out.
Figure 13 shows the hazard for exit to a job separately for men and 
women. We saw from Table 1 that women are notably less likely to leave UI to 
go to a job and Figure 13 shows that this is true throughout - the two hazards 
appear to track one another quite closely with the female hazard always just 
below the male one. Rather than continue to analyse non-parametrically the 
differences in hazards between persons of different characteristics, we turn in 
the next section to multivariate analysis with a parametric assumption for the 
form of the hazard.
4. PARAMETRIC ESTIMATES OF THE OUTFLOW PROBABILITY
In this section we model the probability of exit from UI to different states 
by adopting a simple parametric form for each hazard - the exponential. This 
specifies the probability for individual i of leaving registered unemployment at 
time s to go to state j conditional on unemployment up to s, hlp to be
hy = exp(XjPj) (1)
where X, are observed characteristics and Pj is a vector of coefficients to be 
estimated. This functional form does not allow for the hazard to vary with 
duration of unemployment s. While this is an undesirable restriction, the non- 
parametric analysis reported in Section 3 did not suggest any obvious 
relationship of the hazards with duration and certainly not one that could be 
adequately captured with a simple one-parameter specification such as the 
Weibull.
The hazards of exit to different states are assumed independent and we 
estimate this "competing risks" model by successively maximising the likelihood 
with respect to the parameters of the hazard of each state j while treating as 
censored all exits to states other than j. Let a = 1...A be individuals with 
completed spells of UI receipt of length sa days that end in exit to state j, and b = 
1...B be individuals with censored spells (including exhaustion of UI entitlement 
and spells ending in exit to other states) of length sb days. The log-likelihood to 
be maximised with respect to Pj is given by
In L = Sa In ffsa) + I b In (1-F(sb)) (2)
where l-F(sb)=exp(-sb.exp(Xbpj)) and ffsa)=exp(XaPj).(l-F(sa)). We ignore the 
small number of exits recorded at durations longer than 540 days by censoring
13
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the spells concerned at a value of 540 and treating exit state as unknown (these 
spells are all under the 91 scheme).
The model is estimated separately for men and women and we include 
sets of dummy variables for educational level, age, and county, together with 
other dummies for manual/non-manual status, whether the individual quit the 
last job or not, and whether UI was entered directly from employment or not. 
(Means of all variables are given in the Appendix.) The base categories for the 
dummies are primary education, age 21-25, Budapest, manual, job loser, and 
entry from a state other than employment.
ii) Results
Results are presented in Tables 2 to 8, one for each exit state modelled. 
We do not model exit to early retirement (which may happen within 3 years of 
pension age), normal receipt of pension (which happens automatically when 
pension age is reached) and the residual group "other" that includes death and 
military service. So spells ending in these ways are always treated as censored. 
Since all the explanatory variables are dummies it is convenient to present the 
results in the form of the exponential of each parameter, exp(P), which we label 
the "hazard ratio" in the tables of results. This shows the proportional difference 
between the hazard for an individual for whom the dummy variable concerned 
equals one, relative to the hazard for an individual for whom the dummy equals 
zero (holding other characteristics constant). So a figure of 0.5 indicates a 
halving in the conditional probability of leaving unemployment to go to that 
state, a figure of 1.5 indicates a 50 percent increase in the hazard, and so on. 
The t-statistics reported in the tables are for the test that the hazard ratio equals 
1.0, i.e. that there is no significant difference in the hazard associated with the 
variable concerned. (The large sample sizes imply that conventional levels of 
significance when hypothesis testing may be insufficiently demanding - we 
should certainly not be impressed by a t-statistic of only 2.)
We first discuss the results for each exit state separately, before 
summarising the effect of different characteristics on each state.
Employment
We begin with the results for employment in Table 2. Employment 
accounts for twice as many exits as all others taken together (not including 
exhaustion) and is the exit state in which there is naturally the most interest. 
Higher levels of completed education are associated with a greater probability of 
getting a job for both sexes. The base is primary schooling, the modal level of 
completed education in the sample with 32 percent of men and 48 percent of
14
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women. Compared to this group, those who failed to complete primary education 
(8 percent of each sex) have a hazard that is one third lower, something true of 
both men and women. Vocational schooling or secondary schooling (of either 
type) increases the hazard by 35-50 percent for men relative to that when there 
is only primary schooling but the effect is notably less for women, except in the 
case of vocational secondary schooling where it is the same as that for men. The 
small number of individuals who have been to college or university (less than 3 
per cent of the sample) have a hazard that is 70-80 percent higher than that for 
the base group. Greater age leads to a lower probability of getting a job, 
although it is clear that the relationship would not be adequately modelled with 
a simple one or two parameter function such as a linear or quadratic 
specification.12 There are also some notable differences between the sexes. 
Teenage men have no advantage over the base group aged 21-25 but teenage 
women are substantially more likely than those in their early 20s to get a job; 
their hazard is 60 percent higher and this is one of the biggest differences from 
the base-group that we find for women (a number of the t-statistics for other age 
groups are quite small). (It should be remembered that our restriction to UI 
receipt means that the teenagers in our data are only a small part of all 
teenagers in registered unemployment.) Those in their late 20s or early 30s 
have a hazard that is 12-15 percent lower than that of the base group. The 
hazard for men in their late 30s and early 40s declines again by another 10 
percent relative to the base while for women there is little or no further decline 
in this age range. Then the hazard begins to drop sharply again; women aged 
46-50 and men aged 46-55 have hazards that are lower than those for the base 
group by about 30 per cent and 45 percent respectively. The pre-retirement age 
groups see a very sharp fall in the hazards, which are now about one tenth of 
that for people aged 20-25.
These results do not support the suggestion by Boeri (1994) that the 
probability of leaving unemployment in Central Europe may be more or less 
independent of individual characteristics. The qualitative effect of age (and of 
education) on the hazard in Hungary is in line with findings from the extensive 
literature on unemployment duration in the OECD area. In general, older 
people find it harder to get jobs. This does not of course mean that the size of the 
variation of the hazard with age in Hungary is similar to that in OECD 
countries but in fact they seem similar to those found for British men at various 
levels of overall unemployment by Arulampalam and Stewart (1994) and 
Stancanelli (1994).13
12 A specification with a quadratic in age for men results in a log-likelihood 
that is about 80 points worse. (A piece-wise linear specification with the age 
groupings the same as for the dummy variable specification has a log-likelihood 
that is virtually the same as that obtained with the age dummies.)
13 There are of course problems of comparability due to differences in sample 
definition and of control variables but these differences do not seem enormous.
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How do these results compare to those for the inflow from employment to 
unemployment presented in Section 2? (In making this comparison it should be 
borne in mind that while the results for the outflow control for other observable 
characteristics those for the inflow do not.) In the case of education, we can see 
it is generally true that lower unemployment rates for those with higher levels of 
education are the result of both lower inflow rates and higher outflow rates but 
it is the differences in the inflow rates that are the more marked. In the case of 
age, it seems clear that among men it is those in their early 20s that have the 
greatest turnover through the unemployment register (so far as entry from and 
exit to a job is concerned). It is this group that has the highest entry rate but 
that also has the highest exit rate. Rising age is then associated with a lower 
inflow probability but lower outflow probability.
The next variable is a non-manual dummy. This has no significant 
association with the exit probability to a job. This is in marked contrast to the 
very large differences in inflow rates from employment between manual and 
non-manual workers that we found in Section 2. Of course, the results in Table 
2 control for education and if we exclude the education variables, the coefficient 
on the non-manual dummy becomes significant. But it remains quite small, 
indicating an increase in the hazard for non-manual workers of 26 percent for 
men and of only 13 percent for women. It appears that non-manual status 
greatly reduces the probability of entering unemployment but has only a modest 
positive effect on the probability of then finding a job.
The last two individual characteristics refer to how the last job ended and 
how the spell of UI originated. Those who entered the UI register from 
employment (the sample we analysed in Section 2) are substantially more likely 
to leave to employment than those who did not, other things equal. The hazards 
are 60 percent higher for men and as much as 80 percent higher for women. 
This seems to make more difference than the circumstances in which the last job 
ended although these circumstances are also important. Quitting the last job is 
associated with an exit probability to a job that is about one fifth lower than that 
of job losers.
The set of county dummies have Budapest as the base. County may proxy 
a number of things including unmeasured individual characteristics as well as 
the more obvious possibilities of economic structure and local labour demand. 
We have already seen in Section 3 that taking all exits together, the outflow 
rates by county are not strongly correlated with the county unemployment rates.
The results in Table 2 are obtained separately for men and women using the full 
information on spells (rather than duration up to only three months), control for
Stancanelli’s sample is of male household heads in registered unemployment in 
1983-4. Arulampalam and Stewart use data on men registered as unemployed 
in 1978-79 and 1987-88. The variation of the hazard with age found by the 
latter authors for 1987-88 (when male unemployment was about 11 percent) is in 
fact less than we find for Hungary.
16
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
individual characteristics, and relate to the outflow to jobs, but in general the 
pattern is the same as in Figure 9.14 For both sexes the hazard is significantly 
lower than in Budapest in only the three counties that have the highest 
unemployment rates - Szabolcs, Nograd and Borsod (the difference for Nograd is 
not significant for women and that for men only marginally so). But the 
differences are not very large, the hazard being some 30 percent lower in Borsod 
and only 15 percent in the other two. In 9 out of the total of 19 counties the 
hazards for either sex are not statistically different (at the 5 percent level) from 
those in Budapest.15 Where the hazards are significantly higher than in 
Budapest the differences for men are again not very great, typically about 20-25 
percent, as for example in the three Western counties of Gyor, Vas and Zala. In 
these three counties the hazard for women relative to that in Budapest is about 
60-70 percent higher while in Somogy it is over twice that in Budapest.
Training
About 4 percent of recorded exits (other than those resulting from 
exhaustion of UI entitlement) are to a government sponsored training scheme. 
The findings in Table 3 concerning the determinants of this exit route are of 
considerable interest. In particular, those with low levels of education have far 
lower chances of leaving UI by this route. Among men, someone with general or 
vocational secondary education is over four times more likely to leave UI for a 
training scheme than is a person who only completed primary education. Among 
women, the probability is over five times higher. Those with university and 
college education are even better placed, particularly if men. This may reflect a 
variety of factors. The more educated may be more willing to re-train or may 
react more to the incentive that is offered (a 10 percent addition to 
unemployment benefit). They may be more able to find private training courses 
for themselves that the employment office will approve. The employment offices 
may offer training courses only to the more educated. The part played by 
selection policy of employment offices (or by national policy in the design of 
training schemes) seems misplaced given that the more educated have a notably 
higher probability of finding a job in any case.
14 If we replace the county dummies with the county unemployment rate the 
maximised log-likelihood becomes far lower - there appear to be substantial 
county effects that cannot be captured by such a proxy for labour demand. We 
also tried specifications with vacancy rates and the ratio of unemployment to 
vacancies but with no success.
15 If we force all county effects through the county unemployment rate with 
the exception of a dummy for Budapest, the coefficient on the latter indicates 
men having a probability of finding a job that is 25 percent less than in other 
counties (controlling for differences in unemployment) and women 45 percent 
less.
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The probability of exit from UI to training also falls with age, as it does for 
a job exit. For a person in their late 30s the exit probability is about half that for 
someone in their early 20s, so again it does not seem to be the case that an exit 
route from UI via training is compensating for a reduced probability of getting a 
job. Non-manual women have a 50 percent higher probability than manual 
women of leaving UI for training, re-enforcing the picture for education, 
although interestingly manual/non-manual status makes no difference for men. 
Job quitters are no more or less likely to enter training schemes than job losers; 
persons of both sexes entering the UI register from a job have a 40 percent 
higher probability of going on to training than those entering from some other 
labour market state although this difference is barely significant at conventional 
levels.
With one exception, Somogy, the training exit route is either less likely in 
all counties than it is in Budapest or the hazard is not significantly different 
from that in the capital. Men in Szabolcs and Szolnok, counties with the highest 
and fourth highest unemployment rates in March 1992, have a probability of 
leaving UI to enter training of only one-fifth that in Budapest, the lowest 
unemployment county. In Bacs-Kiskun, where the unemployment rate was 12 
percent, the difference is even greater. (These are all counties where the 
probabilities of training are also much lower for women.) There seems no 
evidence from these results that persons in areas most affected by 
unemployment have the greatest probability to leave UI to enter training 
schemes.
Other labour market programmes
Tables 4, 5 and 6 provide results for the exits to subsidised employment, 
the start-up allowance (subsidised self-employment), and public works, which 
each account for about one percent of recorded exits. We discuss here only 
selected results.
Personal characteristics do not seem important in determining the 
probability of exit to subsidised employment. There is some suggestion that men 
in their early 20s are more likely to leave in this way than other men, which is in 
line with the our finding that this is the group most likely to leave for a normal 
job, but the differences in the probabilities for other age groups are not 
significant at even the 5 percent level (with the exception of the pre-retirement 
group). Male job quitters are about half as likely as losers to leave to subsidised 
employment. For both sexes, the probability is notably higher in the high 
unemployment county of Szabolcs and the low unemployment county of Vas than 
it is in Budapest. Other county effects differ between the sexes with the 
probability being higher in Bekes and Komaron for men.
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Leaving the register with an allowance to start-up one’s own business is 
(not surprisingly) much less likely amongst those of a low educational level. 
Those with post-primary education are some 3-4 times more likely to leave by 
this route than those with primary education or less. Non-manual men have a 
probability double that of manual men. This exit route seems more common for 
both sexes in Bacs and Hajdu (relative to Budapest), for men in Borsod, 
Komaron, Szolnok, Vas and Zala, and for women in Baranya and Bekes. 
However, many of these differences in the county probabilities from Budapest 
are not well determined but it is notable that as with subsidised employment, 
the significant differences from Budapest are almost all positive rather than 
negative.
This finding of the probability of entry to a labour market programme 
being nowhere significantly lower than in Budapest is re-enforced when we look 
at the public works results. (It should be remembered that the opposite pattern 
was found for training.) Exit from the register via this route is so infrequent in 
the capital that we have changed the base county to Borsod in this instance so as 
to see more clearly the differences between the other counties. Among these, the 
probability in Bekes and Vas appears three times that in Borsod (even higher for 
women). (Komaron and Somogy for men and Hajdu for women also appear to 
have higher probabilities.) Looking across the county results for the three 
labour market programmes, Bekes and Komaron appear always to have higher 
probabilities for men. An exit to public works is more likely for men with low 
education, no doubt reflecting the nature of much of the work concerned. Among 
women (for whom this route out of unemployment is substantially less common) 
the probability is actually substantially higher for non-manual workers.
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Disqualification
The final exit route we model is disqualification from UI for refusing a job 
offer or training place. This is quite important quantitatively. For every nine 
recorded exits to a job there is one via disqualification. To whom is this sanction 
applied the most? Results are in Table 7 and although there are some important 
exceptions the answer in a nutshell seems to be the young, the less-educated, 
manual workers, those not entering UI receipt from employment, and persons 
living in four counties including Budapest. The probability of disqualification 
falls monotonically with age although it is only for those in their late 30s or more 
where the differences from the base of the early 20s are significant. From the 
early 40s in the case of women and the late 40s for men the differences become 
quite large, the hazards in these two age groups being about half that for the 
base. The last five years before retirement age is associated with a very low 
probability of disqualification, about a tenth of that in the early 20s. In general 
the risk of disqualification falls with education but an incomplete primary 
education is associated with a lower probability of disqualification (although not 
very well determined), by around 40 percent relative to the base of primary 
education. Non-manual workers are only half as likely as manual workers to be 
disqualified. Being a job quitter seems irrelevant but those entering UI receipt 
from employment have a risk of disqualification about half that of those who do 
not do so.
The regional variation in the probability of disqualification is substantial.
This is to be expected in that disqualification typically results from failure to 
accept or apply for a vacancy suggested by the local employment office and the 
availability of vacancies varies notably between counties. However, due to 
differences in office practices there may also be variation in the severity with 
which the sanction of disqualification is applied, even when the pressure of local 
labour demand is taken into account.16
The results display some notable differences between the sexes. In all but 
four counties outside Budapest (the three low unemployment western counties of 
Gyor, Vas, and Zala together with Somogy) men are significantly less likely to be 
disqualified than in the capital and in no county is the risk higher than in 
Budapest. Some of these differences are very large indeed. Men in Budapest are 
seven times more likely to be disqualified, ceteris paribus, than in Baranya, 
Borsod, Nograd and Szabolcs and in none of the counties where the difference is 
significant is the risk of disqualification less than 40 percent lower than that in 
the capital. The counties just mentioned are all ones where for women the risk 
of disqualification relative to that in Budapest is also substantially less. But for
16 Although a specification with the ratio of unemployment to vacancies 
produces a significant coefficient on this variable, the log-likelihood is much 
higher with the full set of county dummies in Table 7.
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women Budapest no longer stands out as the place where the risk is highest. In 
the three western low unemployment counties - Gyor, Vas and Zala - the 
probability of disqualification is 2-3 times higher than in the capital. As these 
examples illustrate, county differences are in general correlated with differences 
in unemployment rates - a person is more likely to be disqualified in a low 
unemployment county although there are exceptions; Budapest relative to the 
western counties is one example; another is Baranya which had in March 1992 
an unemployment rate in the middle of the range but is associated with a very 
low disqualification probability; and there is Pest which had an unemployment 
rate between those of Vas and Zala but a risk of disqualification for women of 
only a third to a quarter of their level.
Summary
We summarise our findings by characteristics rather than by exit states. 
Overall, we find that observed individual characteristics are associated with 
some substantial differences in outflow probabilities, as are the different 
counties. Higher levels of education are associated with higher probabilities of 
getting a job or entering a training scheme and a lower probability of 
disqualification. A non-manual occupation decreases the disqualification 
probability, and increases the training probability for women but has no effect 
on the training exit for men and no effect for either sex on the probability of 
getting a job. The probability of getting a job, entering training and being 
disqualified all fall with age although the changes in the hazards with age are 
far from smooth. Job quitters are less likely to get jobs than job losers but there 
are no differences between the two groups in the probabilities of entering 
training or of being disqualified. Those entering directly from employment are 
more likely to find a job, more likely to enter training and less likely to be 
disqualified.
County effects on the different hazards are quite varied and difficult to 
summarise succinctly. We focus here on Budapest as an example. The capital 
stands out as a county where the probabilities of entering training and of being 
disqualified from UI are relatively high (as they are in Somogy) but where there 
is no advantage in the probability of entering other labour market programmes. 
Despite being the county with the lowest unemployment rate, the probability of 
getting a job in Budapest is significantly higher than the probabilities in only 
two or three other counties.
What do our results imply about how long different sorts of people stay 
unemployed? In order to answer this question we estimated one final model to 
explain the probability of leaving unemployment to go to any exit state (although 
still treating UI exhaustion as censoring). Using the results of this model we
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estimate the "expected duration" of unemployment for different hypothetical 
people, i.e. the duration of unemployment they are predicted to have.17
Person A has characteristics associated with a much shorter than average 
spell. He is male, he went to college, he is aged 21-25, he is a non-manual 
worker who lost his job and entered unemployment directly from his previous 
unemployment, and he lives in Budapest. Person B is also male but has several 
less favourable characteristics. He only completed primary education, he is aged 
45-50, he is a manual worker and he lives in Nograd (other characteristics are 
the same of those of person A). Our results indicate that A enters 
unemployment facing a spell of 9 months while B should expect to be 
unemployed for 2Vi years. Person C is a woman who only completed primary 
school and is in her late 20s. She entered unemployment having been out of the 
labour force for some time. She’s a manual worker and she lives in Baranya. C 
can expect to be unemployed for 3'A years. D is a little older than C (she is in 
her early 30s) but she completed general secondary school, lives in Vas, and 
comes to unemployment as a job loser direct from work. We predict her duration 
of unemployment to be 11 months.
These examples are not intended to be representative of all the different 
types of people experiencing unemployment in Hungary. And many people with 
the same characteristics as our persons A-D will have spells of unemployment 
that are very different in length from those predicted - shorter as well as longer.
Nevertheless, the examples we have chosen do serve to illustrate two general 
points. First, even those person with favourable characteristics will, on average, 
have quite long periods of unemployment. Second, average duration of 
unemployment does vary substantially between different types of people and 
different areas.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH
The evidence revealed by the data used in this paper provides new 
information on flows in the Hungarian labour market of which we highlight only 
a few features here. The inflow into unemployment insurance registers is 
modest - one percent of insured unemployment in the month in 1992 we 
considered - but probably not as modest as previously thought. Outflow rates 
are very low but (like inflow rates) they certainly do vary with observed 
individual characteristics. As a result of these low rates of flow, the stock of 
unemployed turns over at a slow rate (as previous authors have observed,
17 It would have been possible to calculate expected duration from the results 
for the different hazards in Tables 2 to 7 but it is simpler to estimate a further 
model in which all the exit states are combined. Given the assumption of the 
exponential for the functional form of the hazard, h, expected duration is 
calculated straightforwardly from the results of this final model as 1/h.
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notably Boeri, 1994, 1994a). Men move into and out of insured unemployment 
more quickly than women, who are notably less likely to leave the register to 
take a job. The young are also more mobile than older groups (although inflow 
rates showed less variation with age for women). Persons with firmer 
attachment to the labour market in the sense of having entered unemployment 
benefit direct from a job are quicker to return to work. Substantial differences in 
unemployment rates across counties are associated more strongly with inflow 
rates than with outflow rates.
Policy
The most obvious feature of our results with an immediate bearing on 
policy is the finding that the most likely way for a spell of UI receipt to end is not 
in a job or in any other form of re-entry to the labour market but in exhaustion of 
entitlement to UI. This was despite the long entitlement periods to UI of the 
March 1992 inflow cohort that we have studied. This raises questions for several 
areas of policy. First, what measures will help get people back to work more 
quickly so as to reduce the threat of loss of labour market attachment associated 
with long-term unemployment? Second, is the low outflow rate in part the result 
of disincentive effects in the UI system? Third, are there adequate provisions for 
those who exhaust UI and who have a continuing need for income support?
The steep fall in the proportion of the unemployed stock receiving UI 
during late 1993 and early 1994 is a sharp reminder that the third of these 
questions needs to be urgently addressed. Before the emergence of long-term 
unemployment in Hungary it may have been possible to see social assistance 
benefit as having a merely residual role for those unlucky enough to have failed 
to return to work by the time UI entitlement expires. Such a view is no longer 
tenable. Moreover, legislation in January 1993 substantially reduced 
entitlement periods to UI so it is likely that the incidence of exhaustion in recent 
entry cohorts is even higher than in the one we have studied. By June 1994 
almost equal numbers of unemployed were receiving UI and social assistance 
benefit. The analysis of social assistance for the unemployed should receive an 
equal weight to the analysis of UI.
The volume of demand for social assistance will be affected by 
disincentives for the unemployed to leave the UI register while entitlement 
remains. The question of disincentives has not been our focus in this paper. We 
have however shown in what ways the probability of disqualification from UI 
during a claim varies with individual characteristics and how it varies across the 
country. Disqualification should reflect that a disincentive to job search has 
been formally detected. The finding that disqualification is more common among 
the young and (in general) the less well educated may result from both the 
behaviour of the individuals concerned and a decision by the employment offices
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to focus on this group. Regional differences in the probability of disqualification 
are large and may reflect a need for a review of the way that rules are applied 
across counties.
On the first question raised above our results provide evidence on who has 
the lowest probability of re-entering employment and thus who is most in need of 
assistance in searching for and securing a job. The young and the more 
educated are best placed and yet these are the groups that are most likely to 
leave the register to enter government-sponsored training schemes. (The more 
educated also benefit from an increased probability of assistance into self- 
employment.) Training can be expected not only to increase an individual’s 
short-term prospects but also to reduce the probability of future unemployment. 
The focus on the young may therefore be appropriate in view of their higher 
inflow rate. But we feel it is disappointing that the less educated, who also have 
high inflow rates, are not more likely to enter training. (They are more likely to 
enter public works schemes but these are not programmes that will typically 
improve their employment prospects.) There is a case for a review of policy in 
this area if this situation reflects decisions at a national level or of local 
employment office staff. And as with disqualification there are substantial 
regional differences in the probability of leaving unemployment via training (the 
same applies to other labour market programmes) and the reasons for this are 
not always clear. One question that arises is how active labour market 
programme budgets are distributed across the country and whether the criteria 
used are the right ones.
Further research
There are a range of unanswered questions concerning unemployment 
flows that stem from the research reported in this paper. We have pointed to the 
possibility that the published figure for the inflow to unemployment may be a 
substantial underestimate of the true figure and this merits further 
investigation in order to establish a correct picture of unemployment dynamics 
in Hungary. Our results concerning the variation of the inflow with 
characteristics and region refer to one month and there is the obvious question 
as to whether the patterns revealed are representative of other periods. The 
restriction of the sample to a single month’s inflow also meant that we were 
unable to identify separately variation in the probability of leaving the register 
due to lengthening time unemployed from variation caused by changes in the 
aggregate labour market with calendar time. County "effects" on the different 
exit routes deserve more attention.
The stock of registered unemployment in Hungary has been falling since 
mid-1993, first gradually and then more quickly in the Spring of 1994. This 
must reflect a fall in the inflow rate or an increase in the outflow rate. Figure 2
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suggests that ch anges in  the in flow  are not the exp lanation  (although  a final 
verd ict on  th is m ust aw ait a revised tim e-series o f  in flow s). I f  the registered 
stock has fallen  as a  resu lt o f  an  increase in  the outflow , then  the question  arises 
as to w hat has cau sed  th is increase. O ur data show s the m ost likely  even t that 
w ill en d  a U I cla im  is  exhaustion  o f  en titlem ent. H as the outflow  from  
registered  unem ploym ent increased m ain ly as a resu lt o f  in creases in  the 
n um ber o f  people exh austin g  U I entitlem ent w ho then  cease to register? W h at 
h ap pen s to people w hen  exhaustion  occurs is  an  urgent question  to resolve. 
A dm in istrative sources suggest that about h a lf  o f  exhausters go on  to receive 
social assistance and  w ork  currently  u nder w ay at the N ational L abour C entre is  
a im ed at show in g w hat happens to the rest. Do large num bers drop out o f  the 
la b ou r m arket o r  do m any quick ly find  w ork? In  the form er case the fam ily  
circum stances and liv in g  standards o f  those concerned  w ould  be o f  great 
in terest. T h e la tter w ould  suggest that UI paym ents h ad  previously  acted as a 
substantial d isincentive to searching for w ork  an d  the type o f  data w e have used 
in  th is pap er are one source for the investigation  o f  th is  issue.
25
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
A rulam palam , W , and Stew art, M , (1994), "The D eterm inants o f  Individual 
U nem ploym ent D urations in  an  E ra  o f  H igh  U nem ploym ent: A re the Influences 
D ifferent", m im eo, U n iversity  o f  W arw ick
Boeri, T, (1994), "L abour M arket F low s and  the P ersistence o f  U nem ploym ent in  
C entral and  E astern  E urope", in  B oeri, T, (ed), U nem ploym ent in  Transition
Boeri, T , (1994a), "’T ran sition a l’ U nem ploym ent", E conom ics ,
M arch
K iefer, N , (1988), "E conom ic D uration  D ata and H azard F unctions", Journ al o f  
E conom ic L iterature, June
Lazar, G y, and  Szekely, J, (1994), "R eport on  the F ollow -U p Survey o f  1994 o f  
Those W h o L eft the U nem ploym ent R egister" (in  H ungarian ), N ational Labour 
Centre, B udapest
M eyer, B , (1990), "U nem ploym ent Insurance and U nem ploym ent Spells", 
E conom etrica , July
M icklew right J  and N agy G y, (1994), "H ow  D oes the H ungarian  U nem ploym ent 
Insurance System  R eally  W ork?", E conom ics  o f  T ransition , Jun e
N arendranathan , W , N ickell, S, and Stern, J , (1989), "U nem ploym ent B enefits 
R evisited" in  S N ickell, W  N arendranathan , J  S tem , and J  G arcia , The N ature 
o f  U nem ploym ent in B rita in , O xford U niversity  Press
Stancanelli, E , (1994), "The P robability  o f  L eaving U nem ploym ent: Som e N ew  
E vidence for G reat B ritain", P hD  thesis, E uropean  U niversity  Institute, F lorence
S tem , J  (1989) "U nem ploym ent Inflow  R ates for A utum n 1978", in  S N ickell, W  
N arendranathan , J  S tem , and  J  G arcia , T he N ature o f  U nem ploym ent in  
B rita in , O xford  U niversity  Press
26
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
A ppendix
1. T he A dm in istrative R egister o f  U I B enefits
T h e data w e use are draw n from  the adm inistrative record s  o f  the U I 
system . The N ational L abour C entre (N LC ) collects in form ation  on  each  spell o f  
U I receip t and  th is is  stored in  com puterised form  that contains d ata  resu ltin g  
from  the process o f  jo b  m atch ing and o f  benefit adm inistration  in  loca l 
em ploym ent offices. The jo b  m atch ing data provides som e basic socio-econom ic 
in form ation  such  as sex, age, schooling  and  occupation . The com putation  o f  
benefit leads to  in form ation  am ong other th ings on  date o f  la s t em ploym ent, 
reason  for  unem ploym ent, ben efit schem e, len gth  o f  en titlem ent to benefit, the 
start and  end  dates o f  the benefit spell, reason  for end o f  the ben efit spell and 
periods o f  suspension  from  benefit.
2. S am ple Selection  and  D efin itions o f  In flow
T h e U I database, w hich  covers 1989 to  the present, is  d iv ided  in to  a  "base" 
file  and  a  "paym ents" file  and  it is  the la tter w e use to  define U I spells. T he 
in form ation  on  each  con tinuous period  o f  U I paym ent o r  period  o f  suspension  
from  U I is  recorded  as a separate record in  th is file. S uspension  periods  occur 
w hen  there is  a pause in  a  'liv e '' U I cla im  due to  m aternity  leave, m ilitary 
service, or  for discip linary reasons such  as in su fficien t jo b  search  (form ally, 
"fa ilure to co-operate w ith  the em ploym ent office"). The last o f  these possib ilities  
shou ld  be d istinguished from  an actual d isqualification  from  UI, w h ich  resu lts  in  
a  live  cla im  being  discontinued  com pletely  ra th er than  suspended for w hat 
m ight on ly  be  a  few  days o r  a w eek  or two. A n  in d iv id ual m ay h ave  m ore than 
one record  in  th is file  since the U I database covers several years. M ultip le 
records w ill a lso resu lt even  i f  an  individual h as  m ade on ly  one cla im  to  U I i f  the 
spell la sts  beyond the poin t w hen  the nom inal benefit-w age rep lacem en t ratio  
fa lls, w hich  is  about tw o-th irds o f  the w ay to  m axim um  entitlem ent in  the 92 
schem e (see M icklew right and  N agy, 1994). In th is case the tw o periods o f  
d ifferent w age rep lacem ent ("period  1" and "period  2") are en tered  as separate 
records in  th e paym ents file; period  1 w ill have a  term ination  cod e  in d icating  
con tin uou s paym ent.
W e selected from  the database all spells o f  U I beg in n in g  betw een  21 
F ebruary and  20 M arch  1992 as a  resu lt o f  a n ew  cla im  (benefit paym ents re ­
beg in n in g  a fter a  period  o f  suspension  w ere ign ored  as are "period  2" records
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that fo llow  on  from  "period 1" records). T here are 43 ,239 such spells. C hecking 
the benefit h istory  o f  these cla im ants in  the database we found that som e o f  
them  h ad  a new  U I spell starting in  the relevan t period  very  shortly after the 
end  o f  a previous spell and  w ith  n o in terven in g period  o f  em ploym ent indicated 
in  the files  as show n by  the date o f  last em ploym ent. W e app lied  special ru les 
for decid in g  w hether to keep such cases in  the in flow . (The typical case w as 
"benefit sw itching" (M ick lew right and  N agy, 1994) w here som ebody claim ed for 
benefit in  the 92 schem e ju s t  a fter exh austin g  elig ib ility  in  the 89 benefit 
schem e.) From  th is group  w e excluded from  the in flow  cases w here (i) the 
previous spell ended  because the unem ployed  jo in ed  a train ing program m e, (ii) 
the previous spell term inated in  exhaustion  and  recla im ing occurred w ith in  one 
m onth, (iii) re-em ploym ent w as indicated  in  the file as the exit code for the 
previous spell bu t the clien t reclaim ed w ith in  a w eek  (here w e suppose that the 
spell w as in terrupted due to an adm inistrative error; rem em ber th is ru le w as 
on ly  app lied  i f  there w as no date o f  last em ploym ent recorded a fter the end o f  
the previous spell). W e excluded for such reasons 3,822 spells from  the in flow . 
T he rem ain ing 39,417 spells w ere used for the duration analysis in  the paper 
(Sections 3 and 4).
O ur ca lcu lations o f  inflow rates in  Section  2 are a im ed at m easuring the 
flow  from  em ploym ent to U I receipt. T o try and  ensure consistency o f  the 
num erator and the denom inator in  these ca lcu lations we k ept in  the in flow  on ly 
those unem ployed w ho seem ed to en ter benefits  directly from  em ploym ent. For 
th is purpose we excluded from  the in flow  all claim ants w ho had  n o em ploym ent 
in  the six m onths period before the claim . (S ix  m onths m ay seem  generous but 
w e m ust allow  for jo b  quitters w ho serve ou t a  w aiting  period  before U I begins.) 
There are 7,201 such cases out o f  the 39 ,417 new  spells. T he rem ain in g sam ple 
used for the ca lcu lation  o f  the in flow  rates con tained  32 ,216  cases.
3. T he F ollow -up o f  the Sam ple in  the R egister
In February 1994 we selected all paym ent records o f  the M arch  1992 
in flow  sam ple from  the database. U sin g  these we defined the length  o f  spells 
and the reason  for term ination  o f  benefit paym ent ("exit state"). A s noted above, 
paym ents in  period  1 and  period 2 o f  benefit entitlem ent are registered as 
separate records in  the N LC database and  there are further reasons associated 
w ith  the adm inistration  o f  U I w hy one spell o f  benefit m ay be split betw een  two 
or m ore records. A ll records w ere jo in ed  w hich  indicated benefit paym ents w ith  
no in terruption  - a record en din g w ith  a con tinuous paym ent code and a new 
record starting the day after. (W e a lso jo in ed  the records i f  the gap in  this 
situation  w as on ly  one day.) P aym ent records in terrupted w ith  suspensions not 
longer than a w eek  w ere jo ined . (In  the case o f  lon ger suspensions the spell is  
treated as censored at the poin t w here suspension  begins.)
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In  th is w ay w e can  follow  94 percent o f  spells b y  their end. T he rem ain ing 
6 percent (2 ,264  spells) are labelled  as censored, typ ica lly  because w e lose track 
o f  them  in  the records. There is  a continuous term ination  code but no fo llow ing 
paym ent record ; these spells m ay include m any cases w here benefit stops for a 
period  o f  suspension. C ensoring w ill occur in  a few  cases because the spells are 
not fin ished  by  F ebruary 1994; these are spells in  the 91 benefit schem e w ith  
m axim um  (tw o years) elig ib ility  period.
4. Insured E m ployed in  the Labour Force Survey
F or the denom inators o f  the in flow  rates we estim ate the num ber o f  
"insured em p loyed” from  the Labour Force Survey (LFS), conducted by  the 
C entral S tatistical O ffice. The LFS in terview s about 30,000 households per 
quarter (10 ,000  per m onth). F igures published  b y  C S O  are grossed-up  values o f  
the survey. In the paper w e use calcu lations based  on  the resu lts  o f  the survey 
for Janu ary-M arch  1992 (w hich  w as in  fact th e first quarter surveyed b y  the 
new ly  in trod uced  LFS).
In estim ating  the "insured em ployed" w e take account o f  the ru les o f  
coverage o f  the H ungarian  benefit system . T h is excludes from  U I elig ib ility  all 
em ployees w ho are eligib le for old-age pensions and  all self-em ployed. In 
addition  em ployees m ust have at least 12 m onths o f  em ploym ent during the 4 
years precedin g the cla im  for benefit. W e defined the in su red  em ployed  in  term s 
o f  em ploym ent status and age: we included all m ale em ployees u nder the age o f  
60 and fem ale em ployees u nder the age o f  55 (age lim its for o ld -age pension ) but 
excluded all the self-em ployed. The num ber o f  in su red  em ployed accord ing to 
th is defin ition  w as 85 percent o f  the total em ploym ent in  the LFS in  the first 
quarter o f  1992 w here th is total em ploym ent figure covers all age-groups from  15 
upw ards and  a lso the self-em ployed. Figures A  and  B  in  the A pp end ix  show  the 
proportions o f  in su red  em ployed  in  all em ployed b y  sex, age and  educational 
level.
There is  no in form ation  in  the LFS on  em ploym ent h istory over the 
preceding 4 years, therefore we cou ld  n ot estim ate the n um ber o f  em ployees w ho 
w ould  in  fact fa il to qualify  for U I benefits on  account o f  an  in su fficien t w ork 
history. T h is w ill affect m ost you ng  em ployees w ho have en tered  the labour 
force a short tim e before the date o f  the survey. T he gap betw een  ou r estim ate o f  
the n um ber o f  in su red  em ployed and  the true figure is  h igher in  the low est age 
groups and, as a consequence, we u nder estim ate the U I in flow  rate to  a larger 
extent for the young. O n  the other hand, there m ay be som e persons in  the LFS 
w ho have recently  taken  up self-em ploym ent but w ho h ad  earlier been  in  pa id  
em ploym ent. They w ill be excluded from  our denom inators.
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F ig u re  A : In su re d  e m p lo y e d  a s  th e  p e r ce n ta g e  o f  a ll e m p lo y e d
b y  e d u ca t io n  a n d  sex
F ig u re  B : In su re d  e m p lo y e d  a s  th e  p e r ce n ta g e  o f  a ll e m p lo y e d
b y  a g e  a n d  sex
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Tables
Table A l: Duration of Entitlement to UI of the March 1992 Inflow
Percent of Sample 
(Cumulative)
Days of Benefit 
Entitlement
Scheme
1991 1992
135 0.0 3.6
180 4.0 7.9
225 4.9 11.9
270 11.9 15.7
315 18.2 21.5
360 27.3 27.3
405 28.6 33.8
450 39.1 44.0
495 49.0 63.3
540 59.1 100.0
600 70.9
660 89.8
720 100.0
observations 3,634 35,532
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Table A2: Means of Variables used in Parametric Model of the Hazards
Variable
Schooling
incomplete primary 
primary
vocational school 
vocational secondary 
general secondary 
college 
university 
Age
-20 years 
21-25 years 
26-30 years 
31-35 years 
36-40 years 
41-45 years 
46-50 years 
51-55 years 
56- years 
Occupation 
non-manual 
Circumstances of entry 
entry from employment 
job leaver 
County 
Budapest 
Baranya 
Bacs-Kiskun 
Bekes 
Borsod 
Csongrad 
Fejer
Gyor-Sopron
Hajdu-Bihar
Heves
Komarom
Nograd
Pest
Somogy
Szabolcs
Szolnok
Tolna
Vas
Veszprem
Zala
Men Women
.083 .081
.320 .481
.440 .212
.096 .113
.032 .093
.018 .014
.011 .006
.052 .048
.197 .119
.139 .126
.136 .146
.153 .171
.119 .154
.086 .118
.063 .117
.055 .001
.087 .215
.830 .798
.100 .078
.098 .106
.038 .041
.064 .067
.067 .061
.081 .074
.041 .036
.037 .044
.029 .029
.068 .066
.034 .041
.038 .032
.030 .029
.082 .082
.028 .030
.092 .097
.061 .056
.032 .036
.024 .019
.034 .034
.024 .021
Note: the base categories are primary schooling, age 21-25, manual, entry not from employment, 
job loser, and Budapest
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Table 1: Exit States for Spells of UI starting in March 1992
Sex Benefit Scheme All
Exit State male female 1991 1992
employment 37.0 28.8 24.1 34.8 33.8
subsidised
employment
0.9 1.1 0.6 1.1 1.0
start up 
allowance
1.3 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.1
public works 1.3 0.5 1.1 1.0 1.0
training
scheme
2.0 2.8 2.0 2.4 2.3
disqualified 3.7 4.3 5.8 3.7 3.9
pension/early
retirement
5.3 8.9 2.9 7.1 6.7
other 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
UI exhausted 41.9 46.0 52.9 42.6 43.5
spell censored 5.6 6.0 9.3 5.4 5.8
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: we exclude 2 cases receiving benefit under the 1989 scheme
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Table 2: Hazard to go to Employment
Number of observations 
Log Likelihood
Men
23,853
23,529.9
Women
15,564
12,896.0
Hz. Ratio t Hz. Ratio t
Schooling
incomplete primary .66 6.8 .65 5.5
vocational 1.36 12.0 1.16 3.9
vocational secondary 1.37 7.5 1.39 6.3
general secondary 1.48 6.4 1.17 2.8
college 1.74 6.8 1.69 4.7
university 1.89 6.3 1.59 2.6
Age
-20 years 1.04 0.7 1.60 6.2
26-30 years .88 3.7 .85 2.8
31-35 years .82 5.6 .88 2.3
36-40 years .77 7.4 .90 1.9
41-45 years .73 8.4 .82 3.5
46-50 years .56 12.6 .67 6.3
51-55 years .55 11.1 .13 16.4
56- years .10 15.8 .00 0.4
Occupation
non-manual 1.02 0.4 .94 1.3
Circumstances o f entry
entry from employment 1.60 11.9 1.79 10.9
job leaver .77 5.8 .81 3.1
County
Baranya 1.02 0.2 1.00 0.1
Bacs-Kiskun .93 1.4 1.15 1.9
Bekes 1.27 4.6 1.19 2.4
Borsod .69 6.7 .64 5.3
Csongrad 1.03 0.5 1.09 1.0
Fejer 1.35 4.8 1.37 3.9
Gyor-Sopron 1.27 3.6 1.71 6.0
Hajdu-Bihar 1.05 0.9 1.10 1.3
Heves .96 0.6 1.11 1.2
Komarom 1.11 1.8 1.01 0.1
Nograd .85 2.3 .85 1.5
Pest 1.04 0.7 1.13 1.8
Somogy 1.23 2.9 2.35 10.0
Szabolcs .84 3.3 .84 2.3
Szolnok 1.01 0.2 1.23 2.7
Tolna 1.06 0.8 1.18 1.7
Vas 1.21 2.6 1.70 4.8
Veszprem 1.42 5.7 1.39 3.9
Zala 1.19 2.2 1.61 4.4
Note: the hazard ratio is the hazard for a person for whom the variable concerned equals one 
relative to that for a person in the base category, holding other characteristics constant. The 
base categories are primary schooling, age 21-25, manual, entry not from employment, job loser, 
and Budapest. The t-statistic is for the test of the hypothesis that the hazard ratio equals one.
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Table 3: Hazard to go to Training
Number o f observations 
Log Likelihood
Men
23,853
2,305.9
Women
15,564
1,893.9
Hz. Ratio t Hz. Ratio t
Schooling
incomplete primary .07 2.7 , i i 2.2
vocational 1.31 2.0 .96 0.2
vocational secondary 4.86 10.5 5.14 10.4
general secondary 4.28 7.0 5.14 10.0
college 15.24 12.7 6.08 7.0
university 11.07 8.7 8.05 6.3
Age
-20 years 1.17 0.6 1.14 0.5
26-30 years .86 1.1 .71 2.2
31-35 years .63 3.2 .63 3.0
36-40 years .48 4.8 .62 3.3
41-45 years .39 5.4 .34 6.1
46-50 years .27 5.9 .18 6.6
51-55 years .17 5.1 .04 4.6
56- years 2.91e-06 0.2 .00 0.1
Occupation
non-manual .89 0.8 1.56 3.7
Circumstances o f entry
entry from employment 1.38 2.2 1.40 2.2
job  leaver 1.24 1.3 .96 0.2
County
Baranya .62 1.9 .48 2.6
Bacs-Kiskun .07 4.6 .16 4.6
Bekes .90 0.6 .74 1.4
Borsod 1.01 0.1 .69 2.0
Csongrad .27 3.6 .28 3.5
Fejer .40 2.6 .36 3.1
Gyor-Sopron .87 0.5 .83 0.7
Hajdu-Bihar .46 3.1 .42 3.4
Heves 1.35 1.5 .74 1.2
Komarom .70 1.4 .53 2.1
Nograd .26 3.2 .36 2.8
Pest .97 0.2 .91 0.6
Somogy 1.88 2.9 1.57 2.0
Szabolcs .19 5.3 .25 4.8
Szolnok .21 4.5 .40 3.3
Tolna .60 1.7 .65 1.5
Vas .57 1.7 .38 1.9
Veszprem .72 1.2 .74 1.1
Zala 1.23 0.8 .71 1.0
Note: see Table 2
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Table 4: Hazard to go to Subsidised Employment
Number of observations 
Log Likelihood
Men
23,853
1,214.9
Women
15,564
912.7
Hz. Ratio t Hz. Ratio t
Schooling
incomplete primary .60 1.4 .31 2.3
vocational 1.10 0.5 1.56 2.3
vocational secondary 1.39 1.3 1.45 1.3
general secondary 1.16 0.4 1.10 0.3
college 2.23 1.8 3.38 2.6
university 1.31 0.4 2.73 1.3
Age
-20 years .33 1.9 .69 0.6
26-30 years .79 1.1 1.10 0.3
31-35 years .77 1.2 .98 0.1
36-40 years .78 1.2 1.23 0.7
41-45 years .66 1.8 1.07 0.2
46-50 years .68 1.5 1.34 0.9
51-55 years .59 1.7 .77 0.7
56- years .29 2.3 2.8e-06 0.0
Occupation
non-manual .92 0.3 .97 0.1
Circumstances o f entry
entry from employment 1.01 0.0 1.29 1.1
job leaver .42 2.6 .61 1.2
County
Baranya 1.91 1.6 .77 0.6
Bacs-Kiskun .83 0.4 1.17 0.5
Bekes 3.06 3.4 1.80 1.8
Borsod 1.65 1.5 .41 1.9
Csongrad 1.79 1.5 1.59 1.2
Fejer 1.4e-06 0.1 9.0e-07 0.1
Gyor-Sopron 1.05 0.1 .42 1.2
Hajdu-Bihar .21 2.1 9.1e-07 0.1
Heves .40 1.2 .28 1.7
Komarom 3.24 3.4 1.56 1.1
Nograd 1.3e-06 0.1 9.4e-07 0.1
Pest 2.11 2.3 .86 0.4
Somogy .88 0.2 .85 0.3
Szabolcs 2.52 3.0 2.93 4.0
Szolnok 1.90 1.8 .42 1.6
Tolna 2.01 1.6 .75 0.5
Vas 2.75 2.4 2.95 2.6
Veszprem .45 1.1 8.6e-07 0.1
Zala .67 0.5 .96 0.1
Note: see Table 2
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Table 5: Hazard to go to Start-up Allowance (Subsidised Self-Employment)
Number o f observations 
Log Likelihood
Men
23,853
1497.1
Women
15,564
657.2
Hz. Ratio t Hz. Ratio t
Schooling
incomplete primary 4.6e-06 0.1 3.7e-06 0.1
vocational 2.80 5.5 2.91 3.8
vocational secondary 4.60 6.7 5.35 5.4
general secondary 4.26 4.9 4.56 4.7
college 5.72 5.3 3.47 1.9
university 5.79 4.5 9.70 3.5
Age
-20 years .88 0.3 .63 0.6
26-30 years .99 0.0 .83 0.6
31-35 years 1.28 1.4 .71 1.0
36-40 years .10 0.0 1.20 0.6
41-45 years .86 0.7 .72 1.0
46-50 years .64 1.8 .82 0.5
51-55 years .14 3.3 .10 2.2
56- years 2.7e-06 0.1 5.4e-06 0.0
Occupation
non-manual 2.09 4.1 1.45 1.6
Circumstances o f entry
entry from employment 1.33 1.3 1.16 0.5
job  leaver .60 1.9 .53 1.2
County
Baranya 1.22 0.6 2.46 2.0
Bacs-Kiskun 1.87 2.3 2.82 2.7
Bekes 1.59 1.6 3.71 3.4
Borsod 2.14 3.1 1.68 1.3
Csongrad .32 1.9 1.18 0.3
Fejer .43 1.4 .98 0.0
Gyor-Sopron .30 1.6 .43 0.8
Hajdu-Bihar 2.07 2.7 2.32 2.0
Heves 1.20 0.5 1.33 0.5
Komarom 2.12 2.5 2.37 1.8
Nograd .26 1.8 .41 0.9
Pest 1.67 1.9 1.67 1.2
Somogy .61 0.8 2.8e-06 0.0
Szabolcs .95 0.2 .99 0.0
Szolnok 1.96 2.5 1.68 1.1
Tolna .31 1.6 1.49 0.6
Vas 2.76 3.1 3.4e-06 0.0
Veszprem .71 0.7 .73 0.4
Zala 2.13 2.0 2.5e-06 0.0
Note: see Table 2
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Table 6: Hazard to go to Public Works
Number o f observations 
Log Likelihood
Men
23,853
1,726.4
Women
15,564
465.4
Hz. Ratio t Hz. Ratio t
Schooling
incomplete primary 1.59 2.6 .70 0.6
vocational .68 3.0 .82 0.6
vocational secondary .25 3.9 .89 0.3
general secondary .18 2.4 .84 0.4
college .42 1.3 1.98 1.1
university .28 1.2 1.4e-06 0.0
Age
-20 years .91 0.3 1.62 0.7
26-30 years 1.23 1.0 1.07 0.1
31-35 years .91 0.5 1.32 0.6
36-40 years 1.34 1.6 1.10 0.2
41-45 years 1.01 0.1 1.71 1.2
46-50 years .94 0.3 .77 0.5
51-55 years .86 0.6 .13 1.9
56- years 2.4e-06 0.2 6.5e-06 0.0
Occupation
non-manual 1.31 0.8 2.71 3.1
Circumstances o f entry
entry from employment .98 0.1 3.38 2.3
job  leaver .90 0.5 1.39 0.7
County
Baranya .05 3.0 .19 1.4
Bacs-Kiskun .82 0.5 3.1e-06 0.0
Bekes 1.03 0.1 3.50 1.9
Borsod 3.34 4.7 8.57 3.4
Csongrad .77 -0.6 2.4e-06 0.0
Fejer .37 1.6 .65 0.4
Gyor-Sopron .67 0.7 3.96 1.8
Hajdu-Bihar 1.48 1.3 4.41 2.3
Heves 1.34 0.8 1.35 0.3
Komarom 2.30 2.8 3.03 1.5
Nograd 1.17 0.4 1.69 0.6
Pest 1.19 0.6 1.46 0.5
Somogy 2.77 3.3 2.55 1.0
Szabolcs .93 0.2 1.84 0.9
Szolnok 1.44 1.2 1.86 0.8
Tolna .26 1.9 3.0e-06 0.0
Vas 3.57 4.0 5.75 2.1
Veszprem 1.09 0.2 .72 0.3
Zala 1.33 0.7 1.61 0.4
Note: the base for the county dummies in this table is Borsod; see also Table 2.
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Table 7: Hazard o f UI Disqualification
Number o f observations 
Log Likelihood
Men
23,853
4,160.2
Women
15,564
3,109.8
Hz. Ratio t Hz. Ratio t
Schooling
incomplete primary .63 2.7 .58 3.0
vocational .88 1.7 .77 2.7
vocational secondary .57 3.6 .54 3.4
general secondary .76 1.3 .50 3.3
college .46 1.6 1.34 0.8
university .42 1.4 .00 0.1
Age
-20 years .91 0.5 1.22 1.1
26-30 years .89 1.1 .79 1.7
31-35 years .87 1.3 .79 1.8
36-40 years .81 2.0 .74 2.3
41-45 years .73 2.7 .46 5.1
46-50 years .47 4.9 .44 5.1
51-55 years .26 5.9 .09 8.0
56- years .08 5.1 .00 0.1
Occupation
non-manual .54 3.0 .37 6.1
Circumstances o f entry
entry from employment .53 7.4 .61 5.1
job  leaver 1.02 0.2 1.07 0.5
County
Baranya .14 6.3 .18 4.4
Bacs-Kiskun .34 6.5 .58 2.7
Bekes .49 4.5 1.27 1.4
Borsod .14 9.2 .12 6.1
Csongrad .24 5.8 .19 4.0
Fejer .56 3.2 .62 2.1
Gyor-Sopron .82 1.1 2.47 5.1
Hajdu-Bihar .40 5.9 .69 2.0
Heves .39 4.5 1.10 0.5
Komarom .39 4.7 .63 1.9
Nograd .15 5.8 .43 2.9
Pest .60 4.0 .70 2.1
Somogy .81 1.2 1.45 1.7
Szabolcs .15 9.4 .40 4.7
Szolnok .26 6.9 .68 1.9
Tolna .36 4.5 .44 2.7
Vas 1.04 0.2 2.96 5.3
Veszprem .48 3.6 .72 1.4
Zala 1.10 0.6 2.12 3.6
Note: see Table 2
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Figure 1: Unemployment Stock and Benefit Receipt
a) registered unemployed stock
b) receipt of different benefits in the unemployed stock
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Note: Ul - unemployment insurance; CB - career beginners benefit; SB  - social benefit
Source: NLC
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Figure 2: Monthly Inflows to the Unemployment Benefit Register
Note: Figures include both Ul and CB benefit recipients
Sources: NLC monthly publications
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Figure 3: Inflow rates by age and sex
Figure 4: Inflow rates by educational level and sex
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Figure 5: Inflow rates by county and sex
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Figure 6: County Inflow Rates and Unemployment Rates in March 1992
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Figure 7: Survival function with different treatments of UI exhaustion
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Figure 8: Survivor functions by sex
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Figure 9: County Unemployment Rates and Three Month Outflow Rates
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Figure 10: Hazard rate - exit to any state
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Figure 11: Hazard rate - exit to employment
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Figure 12: Hazard rate - exit to a state other than employment
Spell length, days
50
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
H
az
ar
d
Figure 13: Hazard rates by sex - exit to employment
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